

Treasury Management Quarter Two Report 2022/23

Introduction

In March 2012 the Authority adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's *Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice* (the CIPFA Code) which requires the Authority to approve treasury management semi-annual and annual reports. This quarterly report provides an additional update.

The Authority's treasury management strategy for 2022/23 was approved at a meeting on 2nd March 2022. The Authority has borrowed and invested substantial sums of money and is therefore exposed to financial risks including the loss of invested funds and the revenue effect of changing interest rates. The successful identification, monitoring and control of risk remains central to the Authority's treasury management strategy.

CIPFA published its revised Treasury Management Code of Practice [the TM Code] and Prudential Code for Capital Finance in December 2021. The key changes in the two codes are around permitted reasons to borrow, knowledge and skills, and the management of non-treasury investments. The principles within the two Codes took immediate effect although local authorities could defer introducing the revised reporting requirements within the revised Codes until the 2023/24 financial year if they wish which the Authority has elected to do.

Treasury risk management at the Authority is conducted within the framework of the TM Code. This Code now also includes extensive additional requirements for service and commercial investments, far beyond those in the 2017 version.

External Context

Economic background: The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has continued to put pressure on global inflation and the economic outlook for UK and world growth remains weak. The UK political situation towards the end of the period following the 'fiscal event' increased uncertainty further.

The economic backdrop during the April to September period continued to be characterised by high oil, gas and commodity prices, ongoing high inflation and its impact on consumers' cost of living, no imminent end in sight to the Russia-Ukraine hostilities and its associated impact on the supply chain, and China's zero-Covid policy.

Central Bank rhetoric and action remained robust. The Bank of England, Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank all pushed up interest rates over the period and committed to fighting inflation, even when the consequences were in all likelihood recessions in those regions.

UK inflation remained extremely high. Annual headline CPI hit 10.1% in July, the highest rate for 40 years, before falling modestly to 9.9% in August. RPI registered 12.3% in both July and August. The energy regulator, Ofgem, increased the energy price cap by 54% in April, while a further increase in the cap from October, which would have seen households with average energy consumption pay over £3,500 per annum, was dampened by the UK government stepping in to provide around £150 billion of support to limit bills to £2,500 annually until 2024.

The labour market remained tight through the period but there was some evidence of easing demand and falling supply. The unemployment rate 3m/year for April fell to 3.8% and declined further to 3.6% in July. Although now back below pre-pandemic levels, the recent decline was

driven by an increase in inactivity rather than demand for labour. Pay growth in July was 5.5% for total pay (including bonuses) and 5.2% for regular pay. Once adjusted for inflation, however, growth in total pay was -2.6% and -2.8% for regular pay.

With disposable income squeezed and higher energy bills still to come, consumer confidence fell to a record low of -44 in August, down -41 in the previous month. Quarterly GDP fell -0.1% in the April-June quarter driven by a decline in services output, but slightly better than the 0.3% fall expected by the Bank of England.

The Bank of England increased the official Bank Rate to 2.25% over the period. From 0.75% in March, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) pushed through rises of 0.25% in each of the following two MPC meetings, before hiking by 0.50% in August and again in September. August's rise was voted by a majority of 8-1, with one MPC member preferring a more modest rise of 0.25%. The September vote was 5-4, with five votes for an 0.5% increase, three for an 0.75% increase and one for an 0.25% increase. The Committee noted that domestic inflationary pressures are expected to remain strong and so given ongoing strong rhetoric around tackling inflation further Bank Rate rises should be expected.

On 23rd September the UK government, following a change of leadership, announced a raft of measures in a 'mini budget', loosening fiscal policy with a view to boosting the UK's trend growth rate to 2.5%. With little detail on how government borrowing would be returned to a sustainable path, financial markets reacted negatively. Gilt yields rose dramatically by between 0.7% - 1% for all maturities with the rise most pronounced for shorter dated gilts. The swift rise in gilt yields left pension funds vulnerable, as it led to margin calls on their interest rate swaps and risked triggering large scale redemptions of assets across their portfolios to meet these demands. It became necessary for the Bank of England to intervene to preserve market stability through the purchase of long-dated gilts, albeit as a temporary measure, which has had the desired effect with 50-year gilt yields falling over 100bps in a single day.

Bank of England policymakers noted that any resulting inflationary impact of increased demand would be met with monetary tightening, raising the prospect of much higher Bank Rate and consequential negative impacts on the housing market.

After hitting 9.1% in June, annual US inflation eased in July and August to 8.5% and 8.3% respectively. The Federal Reserve continued its fight against inflation over the period with a 0.5% hike in May followed by three increases of 0.75% in June, July and September, taking policy rates to a range of 3% - 3.25%.

Eurozone CPI inflation reached 9.1% y/y in August, with energy prices the main contributor but also strong upward pressure from food prices. Inflation has increased steadily since April from 7.4%. In July the European Central Bank increased interest rates for the first time since 2011, pushing its deposit rate from -0.5% to 0% and its main refinancing rate from 0.0% to 0.5%. This was followed in September by further hikes of 0.75% to both policy rates, taking the deposit rate to 0.75% and refinancing rate to 1.25%.

Financial markets: Uncertainty remained in control of financial market sentiment and bond yields remained volatile, continuing their general upward trend as concern over higher inflation and higher interest rates continued to dominate. Towards the end of September, volatility in financial markets was significantly exacerbated by the UK government's fiscal plans, leading to an acceleration in the rate of the rise in gilt yields and decline in the value of sterling.

Due to pressure on pension funds, the Bank of England announced a direct intervention in the gilt market to increase liquidity and reduce yields.

Over the period the 5-year UK benchmark gilt yield rose from 1.41% to 4.40%, the 10-year gilt yield rose from 1.61% to 4.15%, the 20-year yield from 1.82% to 4.13% and the 50-year yield from 1.56% to 3.25%. The Sterling Overnight Rate (SONIA) averaged 1.22% over the period.

Credit review:

In July Fitch revised the outlook on Standard Chartered from negative to stable as it expected profitability to improve thanks to the higher interest rate environment. Fitch also revised the outlook for Bank of Nova Scotia from negative to stable due to its robust business profile.

Also in July, Moody's revised the outlook on Bayerische Landesbank to positive and then in September S&P revised the GLA outlook to stable from negative as it expects the authority to remain resilient despite pressures from a weaker macroeconomic outlook coupled with higher inflation and interest rates.

Having completed its full review of its credit advice on unsecured deposits at UK and non-UK banks, in May Arlingclose extended the maximum duration limit for five UK banks, four Canadian banks and four German banks to six months. The maximum duration for unsecured deposits with other UK and non-UK banks on Arlingclose's recommended list is 100 days. These recommendations were unchanged at the end of the period.

Arlingclose continued to monitor and assess credit default swap levels for signs of credit stress but made no changes to the counterparty list or recommended durations. Nevertheless, increased market volatility is expected to remain a feature, at least in the near term and, as ever, the institutions and durations on the Authority's counterparty list recommended by Arlingclose remains under constant review.

Local Context

On 31st March 2022, the Authority had net borrowing of £14.5m arising from its revenue and capital income and expenditure. The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. These factors are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Balance Sheet Summary

	31.3.22 Actual £000
General Fund CFR	57,189
HRA CFR	84,523
Total CFR	141,712
Less: Usable reserves	(105,845)
Less: Working capital	(21,345)
Net borrowing	14,522

* finance leases, PFI liabilities and transferred debt that form part of the Authority's total debt

The treasury management position on 30th September 2022 and the change over the six months is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Treasury Management Summary

	31.3.22 Balance £000	Movement £000	30.9.22 Balance £000	30.9.22 Rate %
Long-term borrowing	70,666	1,270	71,936	
Short-term borrowing	2,521	(521)	2,000	
Total borrowing	73,187	730	73,936	3.38%
Long-term investments	49,959	41	50,000	
Short-term investments	4	0	4	
Cash and cash equivalents	8,702	(7,837)	865	
Total investments	58,665	(7,796)	50,869	3.19%
Net borrowing	14,522		23,067	

Change in cash and cash equivalents due NNDR claw back invoice paid £7.3m and Council tax rebates issued.

Borrowing

CIPFA’s 2021 Prudential Code is clear that local authorities must not borrow to invest primarily for financial return and that it is not prudent for local authorities to make any investment or spending decision that will increase the capital financing requirement, and so may lead to new borrowing, unless directly and primarily related to the functions of the Authority.

PWLB loans are no longer available to local authorities planning to buy investment assets primarily for yield; the Authority intends to avoid this activity in order to retain its access to PWLB loans.

Borrowing Strategy and Activity

As outlined in the treasury strategy, the Authority’s chief objective when borrowing has been to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving cost certainty over the period for which funds are required, with flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority’s long-term plans change being a secondary objective. The Authority’s borrowing strategy continues to address the key issue of affordability without compromising the longer-term stability of the debt portfolio.

Over the April-September period short term PWLB rates rose dramatically, particular in late September after the Chancellor’s ‘mini-budget’ prompted a fall in sterling and rise in market interest rate expectations. Interest rates rose by over 2% during the period in both the long and short term. As an indication the 5-year maturity certainty rate rose from 2.30% on 1st April to 5.09% on 30th September; over the same period the 30-year maturity certainty rate rose from 2.63% to 4.68%. Although interest rates across the board have risen, short-term borrowing from other local authorities remains at lower interest rates than long term borrowing.

In keeping with the Authority’s objectives, no new borrowing was undertaken in the quarter. This strategy enabled the Authority to reduce net borrowing costs (despite foregone investment income) and reduce overall treasury risk.

At 30th September the Authority held £73.9m of loans, an increase of £0.7m from 31st March 2022, as part of its strategy for funding previous years’ capital programmes. Outstanding loans on 30th September are summarised in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Borrowing Position

	31.3.22 Balance £000	Net Movement £000	30.9.22 Balance £000
Public Works Loan Board	73,187	(1,251)	71,936
Local Authorities (short term)	0	2,000	2,000
Total borrowing	73,187	749	73,936

The Authority's borrowing decisions are not predicated on any one outcome for interest rates and a balanced portfolio of short- and long-term borrowing was maintained.

There remains a strong argument for diversifying funding sources, particularly if rates can be achieved on alternatives which are below gilt yields + 0.80%. The Authority will evaluate and pursue these lower cost solutions and opportunities with its advisor Arlingclose.

Treasury Investment Activity

CIPFA revised TM Code defines treasury management investments as those which arise from the Authority's cash flows or treasury risk management activity that ultimately represents balances which need to be invested until the cash is required for use in the course of business.

The Authority holds significant invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. During the year, the Authority's investment balances ranged between £71.3m and £50.9m due to timing differences between income and expenditure. The investment position is shown in table 4 below.

Table 4: Treasury Investment Position

	31.3.22 Balance £000	Net Movement £000	30.9.22 Balance £000	30.9.22 Income Return %
Banks & building societies (unsecured)	8,351	(7,953)	398	0.71%
Money Market Funds	355	116	471	2.06%
Other Pooled Funds				
- Cash plus funds	7,927	73	8,000	
- Strategic bond funds	8,002	(2)	8,000	
- Property funds	6,566	566	6,000	
- Multi asset income funds	27,464	536	28,000	
Other Pooled Funds Sub-total	49,959	1,173	50,000	3.69%
Total investments	58,655		50,869	

Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the Authority to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its treasury investments before seeking the optimum rate of return, or yield. The Authority's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

The increases in Bank Rate over the period under review, and with the prospect of more increases

to come, short-dated cash rates, which had ranged between 0.7% - 1.5% at the end of March, rose by around 1.5% for overnight/7-day maturities and by nearly 3.5% for 9-12 month maturities.

By end September, the rates on DMADF (debt management account deposit facility) deposits ranged between 1.85% and 3.5%. The return on the Council's sterling low volatility net asset value (LVNAV) Money Market Funds ranged between 0.9% - 1.1% p.a. in early April and between 1.8% and 2.05% at the end of September

Given the risk of short-term unsecured bank investments, the Authority has invested £50m in pooled investment funds as shown in table 4 above.

The progression of risk and return metrics are shown in the extracts from Arlingclose's quarterly investment benchmarking in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Investment Benchmarking - Treasury investments managed in-house

	Credit Score	Credit Rating	Bail-in Exposure	Weighted Average Maturity (days)	Rate of Return %
31.03.2022	5.34	A+	100%	1	3.07%
30.09.2022	5.47	A+	100%	1	(5.65%)
Similar LAs	4.34	AA-	57%	42	0.90%
All LAs	4.29	AA-	55%	18	1.47%

Externally Managed Pooled Funds: £50m of the Authority's investments is invested in externally managed strategic pooled bond, multi-asset and property funds where short-term security and liquidity are lesser considerations, and the objectives instead are regular revenue income and long-term price stability. These funds generated a 3.69% income return which is used to support services in year, and (10.06%) of unrealised capital loss.

The April-September period was a very difficult environment for bonds engendered by global central banks' determination to bring high and persistent inflation under control through increases in policy rates and strong rhetoric. The sell-off in gilts, other sovereign bonds and corporate bonds with a rise in gilt/bond yields (i.e. a fall in price) was reflected in the Authority's bond and multi-asset income funds. The increase in policy rates in the UK, US and Eurozone and the prospect of low to no growth and a recessionary period ahead was also a challenging period for equities, the FTSE All Share index falling from 4187 on 31st March to 3763 on 30th September, whilst the MSCI World Index fell from 3053 to 2378 over the same period. The fall in equity valuations is reflected in the multi-asset income funds.

Significant financial market volatility and uncertainty remain due to stagflation fears, little sight of the war in Ukraine ending soon and ongoing supply chain issues, a lingering problem over the past 30 months, yet to be fully resolved.

The change in the Authority's funds' capital values and income earned over the 6-month period is shown in Table 4.

Because these funds have no defined maturity date, but are available for withdrawal after a notice period, their performance and continued suitability in meeting the Authority's medium- to long-term investment objectives are regularly reviewed. Strategic fund investments are made in the knowledge that capital values will move both up and down on months, quarters and even years;

but with the confidence that over a three- to five-year period total returns will exceed cash interest rates.

The Authority had budgeted £1,640k income from these investments in 2022/23.

Non-Treasury Investments

The definition of investments in CIPFA’s revised 2021 Treasury Management Code covers all the financial assets of the Authority as well as other non-financial assets which the Authority holds primarily for financial return. Investments that do not meet the definition of treasury management investments (i.e. management of surplus cash) are categorised as either for service purposes (made explicitly to further service objectives) and or for commercial purposes (made primarily for financial return).

Investment Guidance issued by the Department for Levelling Up Housing and Communities (DLUHC) and Welsh Government also includes within the definition of investments all such assets held partially or wholly for financial return.

Following the approval of the Property Investment Strategy in November 2016, work continues to identify and progress suitable investments to deliver economic regeneration and to generate additional income streams for the future.

The 2021/22 budget includes a forecast of total income (rent and service charges) of £1.94m. Costs including management costs, minimum revenue provision and long term borrowing of £1.30m are forecast resulting in retained income for the General Fund of £640k.

Treasury Performance

The Authority measures the financial performance of its treasury management activities both in terms of its impact on the revenue budget and its relationship to benchmark interest rates, as shown in table 6 below.

Table 6: Performance

	Actual £000	Budget £000	Over/ under	Actual %
Interest Received	1,711	1,640	71	3.19%
Interest Payable	2,443	2,443	0	3.38%

Compliance

The Strategic Director (Finance and Housing) reports that all treasury management activities undertaken during the quarter complied fully with the CIPFA Code of Practice and the Authority’s approved Treasury Management Strategy. Compliance with specific investment limits is demonstrated in table 7 below.

Compliance with the authorised limit and operational boundary for external debt is demonstrated in table 7 below.

Table 7: Debt Limits

	30.9.22 Actual	2022/23 Operational Boundary	2022/23 Authorised Limit	Complied?
Borrowing	£73.9m	£333m	£338.5m	✓

Since the operational boundary is a management tool for in-year monitoring it is not significant if the operational boundary is breached on occasions due to variations in cash flow, and this is not counted as a compliance failure.

Table 8: Investment Limits

	30.9.22 Actual	2022/23 Limit	Complied?
Local authorities & other government entities	0	unlimited	✓
Banks (unsecured)	<£1m	£8m per bank	✓
Any group of pooled funds under the same management	0	£16m per group	✓
Negotiable instruments held in a broker's nominee account	0	£15m	✓
Unsecured investments with building societies	0	£8m	✓
Money Market Funds	<£1m	£10m per fund	✓
Strategic pooled funds	£50m	£10m per fund	✓
Operational bank	<£1m	£20m	✓

Treasury Management Indicators

The Authority measures and manages its exposures to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

Security: The Authority has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments are assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

	30.9.22 Actual	2022/23 Target	Complied?
Portfolio average credit rating	5.47	6	✓

Liquidity: The Authority has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a rolling three-month period, without additional borrowing it can borrow each period without giving prior notice.

	30.9.22 Actual	2022/23 Target	Complied?
Total cash available within 3 months	0.9m	£8m	✓

Interest Rate Exposures: This indicator is set to control the Authority’s exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on the one-year revenue impact of a 1% rise or fall in interests was:

Interest rate risk indicator	30.9.22 Actual £000	2022/23 Limit £000	Complied?
Upper limit on one-year revenue impact of a 1% <u>rise</u> in interest rates	500	500	✓
Upper limit on one-year revenue impact of a 1% <u>fall</u> in interest rates	500	500	✓

The impact of a change in interest rates is calculated on the assumption that maturing loans and investment will be replaced at current rates.

Maturity Structure of Borrowing: This indicator is set to control the Authority’s exposure to refinancing risk. [This indicator covers the risk of replacement loans being unavailable, not interest rate risk.] The upper and lower limits on the maturity structure of all borrowing were:

	30.9.22 Actual	Upper Limit	Lower Limit	Complied?
Under 12 months	3,270	25%	0%	✓
12 months and within 24 months	3,935	50%	0%	✓
24 months and within 5 years	8,451	50%	0%	✓
5 years and within 10 years	15,989	100%	0%	✓
10 years and above	42,291	100%	0%	✓

Time periods start on the first day of each financial year. The maturity date of borrowing is the earliest date on which the lender can demand repayment.

Principal Sums Invested for Periods Longer than a year: The purpose of this indicator is to control the Authority’s exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the long-term principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end were:

	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
Actual principal invested beyond year end	0	0	0
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£30m	£30m	£30m
Complied?	✓	✓	✓

Arlingclose’s Economic Outlook for the remainder of 2022/23 (based on 26th September 2022 interest rate forecast)

	Current	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25	Jun-25	Sep-25
Official Bank Rate													
Upside risk	0.00	0.50	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Arlingclose Central Case	2.25	4.25	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.75	4.25	3.75	3.25
Downside risk	0.00	-1.00	-1.00	-0.75	-0.50	-0.50	-0.50	-0.75	-1.25	-1.50	-1.75	-1.75	-1.75

Arlingclose expects Bank Rate to rise further during 2022/23 to reach 5% by the end of the financial

year.

The MPC is particularly concerned about the demand implications of fiscal loosening, the tight labour market, sterling weakness and the willingness of firms to raise prices and wages.

The MPC may therefore raise Bank Rate more quickly and to a higher level to dampen aggregate demand and reduce the risk of sustained higher inflation. Arlingclose now expects Bank Rate to peak at 5.0%, with 200bps of increases this calendar year.

This action by the MPC will slow the economy, necessitating cuts in Bank Rate later in 2024.

Gilt yields will face further upward pressure in the short term due to lower confidence in UK fiscal policy, higher inflation expectations and asset sales by the BoE. Given the recent sharp rises in gilt yields, the risks are now broadly balanced to either side. Over the longer term, gilt yields are forecast to fall slightly over the forecast period.

Background:

Monetary policymakers are behind the curve having only raising rates by 50bps in September. This was before the “Mini-Budget”, poorly received by the markets, triggered a rout in gilts with a huge spike in yields and a further fall in sterling. In a shift from recent trends, the focus now is perceived to be on supporting sterling whilst also focusing on subduing high inflation.

There is now an increased possibility of a special Bank of England MPC meeting to raise rates to support the currency. Followed by a more forceful stance over concerns on the looser fiscal outlook. The MPC is therefore likely to raise Bank Rate higher than would otherwise have been necessary given already declining demand. A prolonged economic downturn could ensue.

Uncertainty on the path of interest rates has increased dramatically due to the possible risk from unknowns which could include for instance another Conservative leadership contest, a general election, or further tax changes including implementing windfall taxes.

The government's blank cheque approach to energy price caps, combined with international energy markets priced in dollars, presents a fiscal mismatch that has contributed to significant decline in sterling and sharp rises in gilt yields which will feed through to consumers' loans and mortgages and business funding costs.

UK government policy has mitigated some of the expected rise in energy inflation for households and businesses flattening the peak for CPI, whilst extending the duration of elevated CPI. Continued currency weakness could add inflationary pressure.

The UK economy already appears to be in recession, with business activity and household spending falling. The short- to medium-term outlook for the UK economy is relatively bleak.

Global bond yields have jumped as investors focus on higher and stickier US policy rates. The rise in UK government bond yields has been sharper, due to both an apparent decline in investor confidence and a rise in interest rate expectations, following the UK government's shift to borrow to loosen fiscal policy. Gilt yields will remain higher unless the government's plans are perceived to be fiscally responsible.

The housing market impact of increases in the Base Rate could act as a “circuit breaker” which stops rates rising much beyond 5.0%, but this remains an uncertainty.